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  
Abstract—Bidders often feel challenged when looking for the 
best bidding strategies to excel in the competitive environment of 
multiple and simultaneous online auctions for same or similar 
items. Bidders face complicated issues for deciding which auction 
to participate in, whether to bid early or late, and how much to 
bid. In this paper, we present the design of bidding strategies 
which aim to forecast the bid amounts for buyers at a particular 
moment in time based on their bidding behavior and their 
valuation of an auctioned item. The agent develops a 
comprehensive methodology for final price estimation which 
designs bidding strategies to address buyers' different bidding 
behaviors using two approaches: mamdani method with 
regression and negotiation decision functions. The experimental 
results show that the agents who follow fuzzy reasoning with 
regression approach outperform other existing agents in most 
settings in terms of their success rate and expected utility. 
 
Index Terms—E-commerce, Fuzzy reasoning, Multiple linear 
regression, Online auctions, Negotiation decision functions, 
Software agents. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE advent of electronic commerce has dramatically 
advanced traditional trading mechanisms, and online 
auction settings like eBay and Amazon have been 
emerged as a powerful tool for allocating goods and resources. 
Discovery of the new markets and the possibilities opened by 
online trading has heightened the sellers' and buyers' interest.  
In recent years, online auctions have become a widely 
recognised paradigm of item exchange, offering traders greater 
flexibility in terms of both time and geography.  In online 
auction commerce, traders barter over products, applying 
specific trading rules over the Internet which support different 
auction formats. Common online formats are English, Dutch, 
First-price sealed-bid and Second-price sealed-bid auctions [1, 
2].  
Bidders in this marketplace face difficulties when looking 
for the best bidding strategies to win the auction. Moreover, 
there are commonly many auctions selling the desired item at 
any one time. Deciding which auction to participate in, 
whether to bid early or late, and how much to bid are very 
complicated issues for bidders [3, 4]. The difficult and time-
consuming processes of analysing, selecting and making bids 
and monitoring developments need to be automated in order to 
 
 
assist buyers with their bidding. 
The emergence of software agent technology has created an 
innovative framework for developing online auction 
mechanisms. Because of their extraordinary adaptive 
capabilities and trainability, software agents have become an 
integral component of online trading systems for buying and 
selling goods. These software agents represent expert bidders 
or sellers to fulfil their requirements and pursue their beliefs, 
and are consequently trained to achieve these aims. Software 
agents can perform various tasks like analysing the current 
market to predict future trends, deciding bid amounts at a 
particular moment in time, evaluating different auction 
parameters and monitoring auction progress, as well as many 
more. These negotiating agents outperform their human 
counterparts because of the systematic approach they take to 
managing complex decision-making situations effectively [5].  
This creates more opportunities for expert bidders and sellers 
to maximise satisfaction and profit. Software agents make 
decisions on behalf of the consumer and seek to guarantee that 
items are delivered to the buyer’s preferences. To function 
well, these agents must have prior knowledge of the auction’s 
features, whether these are certain or uncertain. 
eBay is one of the major global online marketplaces and 
currently the biggest consumer-to-consumer online auction 
site. Founded in 1995, eBay Inc. has attracted over 112 million 
active users and gained a net revenue of $14.1 billion for  
2012 . eBay does not, however, actually sell any goods that it 
owns; it only makes the process of displaying and selling 
goods easier by facilitating the bidding and payment 
processes. In virtual terms, eBay provides a marketplace 
where buyers and sellers meet and transact. eBay is a great 
source of high quality data as it keeps detailed records of 
completed auctions, and this data has been used extensively by 
researchers to solve research issues involving online auctions 
[6-12].  
eBay-style auctions adopt the English auction format, 
except with regard to the payment of the winning bid [2]. In 
eBay auctions, the winner is the bidder with the highest value 
bid, but instead of paying his own bid, he pays the second-
highest bid plus the amount of one bid increment. Bidders in 
these auctions do not, however, bid their maximum valuation 
of the item offered. This is either because they do not grasp 
that they should do so or they simply have trouble figuring out 
what their maximum valuation is. These bidders are typically 
afraid of winning the auction at a price above the true value of 
the item, a phenomenon sometimes known as ‘the-winner's 
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 curse’. This problem occurs because the bidder lacks 
information about the true value of the item.  In this respect, 
closing price prediction can assist bidders to establish the true 
value of the item on auction and thus finalise the maximum 
amount that they are willing to pay. This helps them to 
develop a bidding strategy to win the auction if the price is 
appropriate to an item’s value, and it also allows experienced 
bidders to win auctions at a lower cost [13]. By presenting 
consistent information, closing price prediction supports 
buyers to make more informed bidding decisions [14]. This 
also solves some of the information asymmetry problem for 
buyers, cutting down transaction time and cost. At the same 
time, sellers can use predictions to identify when the market 
favours selling their products and assess the value of their 
inventory better. They can also optimise auction attributes and 
the selling price for their wares [15]. 
Predicting the end-price of an online auction is challenging 
because it depends on auction’s attributes which are dynamic 
in nature [11, 15, 16]. The amount of the winning bid can be 
forecasted effectively by analysing the data produced as an 
auction progresses (historical data). Analysis of the plethora of 
data produced in online auction environments can be done 
using data mining techniques to predict the end-price of an 
online auction [6, 17, 18]. Data from a series of identical or 
similar closed auctions has been used in the past to forecast 
the winning bid by exploiting regression, classification and 
regression trees, multi-class classification and multiple binary 
classification tasks  [11, 19]. The history of an ongoing auction 
also contains significant information; this can be exploited for 
short-term forecasting of the next bid by using support vector 
machines and functional k-nearest neighbor approaches [20], 
clustering [18] and regression and classification techniques 
[15]. 
Furthermore, bidders repeatedly adjust their bids towards 
their maximum valuation of an item based on the time left in 
the auction and the bids placed by other participants. This 
triggers different bidding behaviours. Analysis of these 
bidding behaviours suggests that agents can be categorised as 
evaluators, participators, opportunists, snipers, unmaskers or 
shill bidders [21, 22]. Evaluators have a clear idea of their 
valuation of the item and place a single, significantly high bid 
during the early phase of the auction. Participators make a low 
initial bid and then place ascending bids as the auction 
progresses. Opportunists place the minimum required bid just 
before the auction closes. Snipers bid in the closing seconds of 
the auction. Unmaskers make multiple bids, bidding 
continuously over a short span of time, without any 
intermediate bids while the auction is progressing. Shill 
bidders do not intend to win the auction and place fake bids to 
increase the end-price of the item. These different types of 
bidders all perform continuous, early or late bidding based on 
their bidding behaviours. Late bidding especially has drawn 
considerable attention from professionals and researchers of 
eBay-style auctions, which apply hard closing rules with fixed 
end-times [1, 23]. The decision of bidders in these 
environments to postpone their bids until the auction’s last 
moments is indeed a rational and effective winning strategy 
[24]. This may be the best response to a variety of incremental 
bidding strategies because late bidders deprive incremental 
bidders of ample response time; they perform intelligent 
bidding, drawing on the information they have gathered from 
the earlier bids of these incremental bidders. Late bidders can 
also protect their private information about the value of an 
item, avoiding bidding wars with incremental bidders who 
compete in these auctions; this leads to higher payoffs for the 
winners [25].  
Nevertheless, there are risks involved with last-second 
bidding. These late-coming bids may be lost in Internet 
congestion and extended connection times. As a result, bids 
may not reach the auction before its closes.  One survey found 
that 86% of participants had experienced this problem at least 
once [25]. In addition, a strict focus on calculated last-moment 
bidding does not allow for the emotional overbidding that 
most buyers experience when bidding on eBay. Moreover, if 
we consider the auction-bidding process as a kind of sport, 
last-moment bidding shows poor sportsmanship that misleads 
the auction.  Therefore, in this article, bidding strategies are 
designed not only for the types of bidders who interject a 
single bid at the last second in the  auction, but also for those 
who place one or many bids towards the tail end. 
Against this background, the research reported in this 
article addresses the problem of how to develop successful 
bidding strategies for the different bidding behaviours of the 
buyers who take part in eBay auctions. When designing 
bidding strategies for the eBay environment, there are a 
number of common challenges that have to be dealt with. Of 
all of these, predicting the closing prices of ongoing auctions 
and allowing for the behaviour of different bidders are the 
most critical concerns for those trying to find optimal bidding 
strategies for bidding agents. These bidding strategies are 
designed for potential buyers and aim to forecast their bid 
amounts at a particular moment in time based on their bidding 
behaviour and their valuation of an auctioned item. 
An Automated Dynamic Bidding Agent-ADBA is 
developed that uses fuzzy reasoning techniques for bidding in 
an environment of multiple and simultaneous online auctions 
of same or similar items. ADBA selects an auction to 
participate in and assesses the value of the item as in [26]. The 
final price of the selected auction is predicted by designing 
bidding strategies based on bidding behavior of bidders using 
Mamdani’s Method for fuzzy relations with regression 
techniques and Negotiation decision functions. This paper 
concentrates on designing bidding strategies for the buyers.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section II 
we present the methodology for developing the biding 
strategies for the bidding agent. Section III and Section IV 
design the bidding strategies using fuzzy regression techniques 
and negotiation decision functions respectively. Section V 
evaluates the designed methodologies. Section VI depicts 
experimental results evaluating the success rate and the 
expected utility of the bidding strategies designed for different 
bidding behaviors of the bidders. Section VII concludes the 
paper. 
II. DESIGNING BIDDING STRATEGIES FOR THE ADBA AGENT 
The bidding strategies for ADBA agents are designed based 
on the calculation of a bid amount at a particular moment in 
time for bidders who place one or many bids towards the tail 
end of the auction. 
 These bidders are categorised based on the number of bids 
they make and the timing of their bid placement. Those who 
make just a single bid are identified as Mystical and Sturdy 
bidders. Mystical place their only bid in the closing moments 
(the last five seconds) of the auction while Sturdy bidders 
lodge just one bid in the five minutes before the end. Bidders 
who make several bids in the last hour of the auction are 
identified as Strategic. These bidders up their bid amounts 
strategically based on the bids recorded by other participants. 
Generally speaking, bidders tend to exhibit one of two 
attitudes: they may be desperate to win an item, or they may 
be willing to bargain for it [27]. These two attitudes are 
described here as Ambitious and Sophisticated respectively.  
Fig. 1.  Types of bidders 
 
A bid by these bidders equals the maximum value that the 
agent is willing to pay at that point in time. The agent 
determines this value based on bidding characteristics such as 
the auction's attributes, the bidder's own attitude and other 
bidders’ attitudes. The auction’s attributes have been 
considered in predicting the initial price of the auction in [26]. 
Two types of the bidder's own attitudes, Ambitious and 
Sophisticated, are also taken into account in this study.  
Other bidders’ attitudes are used to gauge competition in an 
auction; their previous bids (competing bids) are noted and 
exploited. Bidders update their bids at a particular moment in 
time based on others' bids [28]. When the earlier offers of 
other bidders (competing bids) are higher and the rate of bid 
change accelerates, a bidder will make higher bids in more 
frequent increments to win the auction. These are indications 
of heightened competition. Further, the time left until the 
auction closes is an important factor that also affects 
competition. Bidders decide fast towards the end of an auction 
due to the time pressure. This pressure increases arousal, and 
bidders bid beyond their limits as the deadline approaches 
since there is so little time left [29]. This exacerbates the sense 
of competition among auction participants. In other words, 
competition rises as the remaining duration of the auction 
wanes. 
The bidding strategies in this article are designed to model 
the bid amount at a particular moment in time for each bidding 
behaviour in Fig. 1 using fuzzy reasoning with regression 
techniques and negotiation decision functions.  
III. BIDDING STRATEGIES USING FUZZY REGRESSION 
TECHNIQUE 
Mamdani’s Method for fuzzy relations and the 
compositional rule of inference are used to design bidding 
strategies for buyers [30]. The value of the auction is 
calculated based on the competition in that auction, and the 
bidding attitude of buyers with different bidding behaviour 
(where bid increment (ΔP) is the amount by which the bidder 
raises the current bid and the current bid is the initial bid pi, 
the predicted closing price of the selected auction, as 
described in [26]). The multiple linear regression is used to 
further improve the auction value. First, the level of 
competition in the auction is assessed, and then the bid 
increment is calculated for different bidding behaviours of 
bidders. Finally, regression models are used to calculate bid 
amount of the auction. 
A. Competition Assessment 
The degree of competition is assessed using the remaining 
duration of the auction and the previous offers made by 
competing participants. Assume C is competition, having a 
fuzzy set of values as c1,c2,……..cn, D is the remaining 
duration, having a fuzzy set of values as d1,d2,……..dn  and B 
is competing bids, having a fuzzy set of values b1,b2,……..bn. 
According to Mamdani’s Direct Method, the adaptability n no. 
of rules w1, w2……..wn are found as follows:  
 
w1=µd1(D)  ۷ µb1(B) 
w2=µd2(D)  ۷ µb2(B) 
…………………….. 
wn=µdn(D)  ۷ µbn(B) 
 
Competition is then assessed for each rule as follows: 
 
µc’1 (C) =w1 ۷  µc1 
µc’2 (C) =w2 ۷  µc2 
…………………… 
µc’n (C) =wn ۷  µcn   
 
These rules are aggregated for the final competition 
evaluation: 
 
                      (1) 
 
A definite value of competition is found by applying centre 
of gravity of the fuzzy set in (1) as follows; 
 
 
 
                      (2) 
 
B.  Bid Determination 
The bid increment ΔP for the auction is calculated based on 
attitudes and competition by applying Mamdani’s Method for 
fuzzy relations and the compositional rule of inference. Let ΔP 
have the fuzzy set of values p1,p2,……..pn, E is attitudes with a 
fuzzy set of values as e1,e2………en and C is competition with 
a fuzzy set of values as c1,c2,……..cn.  
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 Here, premise 1: IF c is C and e is E THEN p is ΔP 
   premise2: c is C’ and e is E’   
   consequence: p is ΔP’ 
 
where C, C’, E, E’, ΔP and ΔP’ are fuzzy sets. As per the 
mechanism of fuzzy reasoning, we infer " p is ΔP’" when the 
condition " c is C’ and e is E’ " is given for the rule " IF c is C 
and e is E THEN p is ΔP".  
Using a fuzzy relations approach, we first convert the IF-
THEN rule in premise 1 into the fuzzy relation RC and E → ΔP. 
Then, by applying compositional operation, we infer 
conclusion ΔP’ from the fuzzy relations RC and E → ΔP and the 
condition "c is C’ and e is E’" of premise 2 (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Fuzzy reasoning by using fuzzy relations and the compositional rule of 
inference 
 
According to Mamdani’s Method for fuzzy relations and 
the compositional rule of inference, the rule ei and cj→ pk is 
described by: 
 
 
                      (3) 
 
The conversion in (3) is based on a Cartesian product such 
as:  
 
                      (4) 
  
The conversion by using the membership value form is 
given as follows: 
 
                      (5) 
 
For n number of rules, the compiled fuzzy relation R is 
given as: 
 
                      (6) 
 
 
For the input of fuzzy sets E’ on E and C’ on C, the output 
fuzzy set ΔP’ on ΔP can be obtained as follows: 
 
 
                      (7) 
 
The value for the auction is calculated as   pi + ΔP’ 
                       
The fuzzy set E' depends on the bidding strategy selected 
for the bidding agent. Ambitious bidders always have a higher 
attitude to win the auction than Sophisticated bidders because 
the Ambitious bidders are desperate to get the item. 
Accordingly, the fuzzy set E' is described such that E is high 
for Ambitious bidders and low for Sophisticated bidders. 
However, Sophisticated Strategic bidders have a higher 
attitude to win the auction than the Mystical and Sturdy 
bidders of similar type, so E is also high for Sophisticated 
Strategic bidders.  
The auction values are used to predict the bid amount of the 
auctioned item using multiple linear regression technique. 
This model has been used to fit a linear relationship between 
the dependent variable and a set of predictor variables. The 
multiple linear regression model is employed based on the 
assessed competition and the calculated auction values. To 
predict the bid amount, regression coefficients for each 
predictor variable  are opted such that the sum of squares 
between the predicted and the actual bid over all the training 
auction data is minimal [26]. 
 
 
                    (8) 
 
 
 
where yi is the bid amount of the item for the i
th
 auction 
m is the total number of predictor variables 
wj is the regression coefficient for the j
th
 predictor variable 
aij is the j
th
 predictor variable for the i
th
 auction.  
IV. BIDDING STRATEGIES USING NEGOTIATION DECISION 
FUNCTIONS 
The bidding strategies are designed by calculating the bid 
amount at a particular moment in time based on the initial 
price (pi) (as in [26])  and using the negotiation decision 
functions (NDFs) given by Faratin et al. [31]. First of all, a bid 
value is recommended at a particular moment in time based on 
the competition in the auction. Second, this value is updated to 
determine the bid amount for buyers with different bidding 
behaviours. 
A. Competition and Bid Determination 
The bid amount is calculated using negotiation decision 
functions (NDFs) in two phases. In the first phase, the amount 
is determined based on the competition in an auction. NDFs 
are applied for the remaining duration of the auction and 
competing bids. In the second phase, the bid is updated in 
order to design bidding strategies for each type of bidding 
behaviour in Fig. 1 according to the listed bidding attitudes. 
Assume that F(t) is the function that determines the bid 
amount based on the remaining duration and Fc(t) is the 
function that determines the bid amount based on competing 
bids. Assume also that the agent’s bids occur at time 0 ≤ t ≤ 
tmax and the agent’s bidding limit is [minb, maxb].  The bidding 
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 agent defines a constant k, which when multiplied by the size 
of the interval, gives the value of the starting bid amount. F(t)  
with 0 ≤ t ≤ tmax is represented using a function  
 tα  as 
follows: 
 
                       (9) 
 
where 
 
                       (10) 
 
A wide range of time-dependent functions can be calculated 
by varying the value of α(t), where 0≤ α(0)≤1 , α(0)=k and 
α(tmaxt)=1 ,which ensures that the bid amount remains within 
the value range. Initially this represents the starting bid and at 
the end of the auction at t = tmax , the bid amount reaches the 
reservation price of bidder, i.e. pr (the maximum value of the 
auctioned item set by the bidder). 
β is a constant which belongs to R+. A number of possible 
bidding regulations can be obtained by varying the value of β 
for different bidder-specific issues. For Ambitious bidders who 
are desperate to have the item, β >1 and the agent quickly 
goes to its reservation price pr. where pr = pi = maxb. The 
mathematical model for this behaviour is as follows: 
 
                       (11) 
 
 
For Sophisticated bidders, who are willing to bargain for an 
item, β < 1 and the minimum bid amount is maintained until 
tmax is almost reached. The mathematical model for this 
behaviour is as follows: 
 
 
                       (12) 
 
 
The computation of α(t) with respect to time (presented here 
as relative to tmax) for β ≥1 and β ≤ 1 is presented graphically 
in Fig. 3.  
Fc(t) computes the bid amount at time t based on the 
previous bids placed by other participants. To calculate Fc(t) at 
a particular moment of time t, the agent reproduces the 
behaviour of the other participants in earlier steps for  δ ≥ 1  
where n >2δ. 
 
 
                       (13) 
 
 
where F
’
(t) is the bid amount placed by the other participants 
at time t.  
At a given time, the bidding agent may consider any 
combination of these issues based on its current situation, As 
such, bid amounts can be computed to reflect the level of 
competition in the auction.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Fig. 3.  Fuzzy Computation of α(t) for  β ≥1 (a) β ≤ 1 (b) 
 
In the second phase, the bid amount is updated to design 
bidding strategies for bidders with different bidding 
behaviours, as detailed below. 
 
1) Mystical Bidding Strategy 
 An agent with this strategy places a single bid in the closing 
moments of the auction. This bid amount depends upon the 
remaining duration of the auction, as well as on competing 
bids.  
The bid amount at time t for Mystical behaviour will be 
calculated as the average of F(t) as in (9) and Fc(t) in (13). 
Here, minb is the lower bound of the bid value at the start of 
the last five seconds of the auction. The values for k and β are 
set according to the bidding attitude of the bidders. For 
Ambitious Mystical bidders, the value of k will be high and β > 
1, since this type of bidder bids at a price near to the 
reservation price pr. On the other hand, for Sophisticated 
Mystical bidders, the value of k will be low and β < 1. 
2) Sturdy Bidding Strategy 
 This strategy is similar to Mystical bidding behaviour with 
the exception of the time at which a bid is placed. A bidder 
with Sturdy behaviour will place a single bid during the last 
five minutes of the auction based on the time remaining and 
the competing bids.  
F(t) and  Fc(t) functions are similar to those in Mystical 
behaviour where they are used to compute the bid amount.  
Here, however, minb is the lower bound of the bid amount at 
the beginning of the last five minutes of the auction. The 
values for k and β for Ambitious Sturdy and Sophisticated 
    
b
min
b
maxtα
b
mintF 
      1/βmax/tmaxtt,mink1ktα 
     1

1/β
max/tmaxtt,mink1k  Lim

     k1/βmax/tmaxtt,mink1k   
0
Lim 

 


















 bmax,bmin),1nF(t
)
2δn(t
'
F
)
22δn(t
'
F
maxmin1ntcF
 Sturdy bidders follow the same conventions as when Mystical 
bidders have these attitudes. 
3) Strategic Bidding Strategy 
 Strategic bidders place multiple bids during the last hour of 
an auction. In this strategy, each and every bid is strategically 
placed based on the bids of competing bidders in the auction. 
These bidders continue bidding until the bid amount reaches 
their reservation price pr.  
Each bid will be calculated as the average of F(t) and Fc(t). 
The value of minb is the lower bound of the bid amount at the 
beginning of the last hour of the auction. An Ambitious 
Strategic bidder starts bidding at a value close to his valuation 
for the item; the values for k are high for this bidding strategy. 
Here β > 1, since bidders with an Ambitious attitude tend to 
quickly reach pr before the deadline is reached by placing 
multiple bids. However, Sophisticated Strategic bidders do not 
start bidding at an amount close to pr; rather, they increase 
their bid amount slowly based on the other bids in the auction. 
As such, the values for k are low and β < 1 for Sophisticated 
Strategic behaviour.  
 
TABLE I 
CHOICE OF K AND β FOR DIFFERENT BIDDING STRATEGIES 
 
Bidding Strategy k β 
AMST 0.6≤ k≤1 β > 1 
SMST 0≤ k≤0.3 β < 1 
ASTD 0.6≤ k≤1 β > 1 
SSTD 0≤ k≤0.3 β < 1 
ASTG 0.6≤ k≤1 β > 1 
SSTG 0≤ k≤0.6 β < 1 
 
Assume AMST and SMST represent the Ambitious Mystical 
and Sophisticated Mystical bidding strategies respectively, and 
that ASTD and SSTD represent the Ambitious Sturdy and 
Sophisticated Sturdy bidding strategies respectively. ASTG 
and SSTG represent the Ambitious Strategic and Sophisticated 
Strategic bidding strategies respectively. The values of k and β 
for these behaviours are shown in Table I. 
 
V. EVALUATING BIDDING STRATEGIES 
The bidding strategies based on the NDFs and fuzzy 
reasoning were evaluated separately by performing two sets of 
experiments. First, the NDFs based bidding strategies will be 
evaluated.  
The ADBA system generates two types of agents for 
evaluating the bidding strategies based on NDFs: NDF-DC 
and NDF-D. The NDF-DC agents design the bidding 
strategies using the NDFs, which depend on both the F(t) and 
Fc(t). Here DC refers to the agents that calculate the bid 
amount using the remaining Duration of the auction and 
Competing bids. NDF-D agents design bidding strategies 
using NDFs, which only depend on F(t) and not on Fc(t). Here 
D refers to agents that calculate the bid amount using the 
remaining Duration of the auction. In order to evaluate the 
performance of both NDF-DC and NDF-D agents in a wide 
variety of test environments, the agents were subjected to 
different action settings and to different bidding restrictions 
(bargain level).  In this set of experiments, to compute F(t), 
values for k and β were chosen as given in Table I. To 
compute the function 
 1nc tF , the initial values of 
)( 22
'
 ntF , 
)( 2
'
ntF  and 
)( 1ntF  were calculated at 
δ=1 for all the bidding strategy types i.e. Mystical, Sturdy and 
Strategic. For Mystical, Sturdy and Strategic behaviours, δ=1 
at the beginning of the last five seconds, the last five minutes 
and the last hour of the auction respectively. Initial values of
)( 22
'
 ntF , 
)( 2
'
ntF  and 
)( 1ntF  were assigned from 
the bid history of the auction in which the bidders were then 
participating. The current maximum bid was assigned to
)( 22
'
 ntF , and the previous bid was assigned to  
)( 1ntF  followed by )( 2
'
ntF .  
Two types of attitudes of bidders were considered: 
Ambitious and Sophisticated. Bidders with an Ambitious 
attitude start bidding at a higher price close to their reservation 
value pr and their bid amount is not so affected by the bid 
amounts placed by the other bidders due to their desperate 
behavior. AMST, ASTD and ASTG bidding strategies follow 
this type of attitude. Bidders who are willing to bargain always 
bid strategically based on the bids placed by the other 
competitors. SMST, SSTD and SSTG follow this type of 
attitude. As the bidding strategies described above select bids 
based on the remaining time as well as on the bids placed by 
the other participants, these strategies will be successful when 
the bidder has a desire to bargain attitude.  Thus, we need to 
evaluate the performance of agents who act strategically based 
on the bids placed by the other participants, i.e.  bidders with a 
Sophisticated attitude. 
In the second set of experiments, Fuzzy agents were 
evaluated against the NDF-DC agents in a similar auction 
environment as above. In order to compute ΔP, linguistic 
variables for the bidder's attitude and competition assessment 
were chosen. The bidding strategies were analysed by 
considering the following sets of logical rules using various 
fuzzy sets: 
 
Rule 1: IF the attitude of the agent to winning the auction is 
E1 AND competition on the market for that product is C1, 
THEN the bid increment will be P1 
Rule 2: IF the attitude of the agent to winning the auction is 
E1 AND competition on the market for that product is C2, 
 THEN the bid increment will be P2 
Rule 3:  IF the attitude of the agent to winning the auction is 
E2 AND competition on the market for that product is C1, 
THEN the bid increment will be P2 
Rule 4: IF the attitude of the agent to winning the auction is 
E2 AND competition on the market for that product is C2,  
THEN the bid increment will be P3 
These fuzzy sets represent the linguistic variables as follows: 
attitudes low as E1 and high as E2, competition low as C1 and 
high as C2. P1, P2 and P3 were the bid increments based on the 
characteristics of the auction, where P3≥P2≥P1. We assumed 
that the set of attitudes for buying any item was 
E=[e1,e2,e3]=[0,0.5,1.0], and the set of competition for the 
item on the market was C=[c1,c2,c3]=[0,0.5,1.0]. The fuzzy 
sets used in the preceding four rules can be quantized as 
shown in Fig. 4. 
 
E1=[1.0,0.5,0]   C1=[1.0,0.5,0]  P1=[1.0,0,0] 
E2=[0,0.5,1.0]   C2=[0,0.5,1.0]  P2=[0,1.0,0] 
                P3=[0,0,1.0] 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Fuzzy sets for bidding logic 
 
For all these bidding strategies, competition was assessed 
based on the remaining duration and the bids placed by other 
participants (competing bids).  These bidding strategies will be 
successful when the bidder has a desire to bargain attitude, in 
a similar vein to the situation with the bidding strategies using 
NDFs. This set of experiments, thus, needed to address the 
performance of bidding agents with a Sophisticated attitude 
who act strategically based on the bids placed by the other 
participants. 
The success rate percentage and the expected utility of the 
bidding agents are used as the performance measures. 
Success rate percentage = Rsuccess = rsuccess*100 
where rsuccess is the success rate and rsuccess = Nwin / Ntotal  ,  
Nwin is the number of auctions won by the agent and Ntotal is the 
total number of auctions. 
Expected utility= Uexp = Uwin * rsuccess 
where Uwin is the utility of the winning agent. 
and Uwin =  (pr-vi)/pr , where pr is the reservation price 
(maximum amount the bidder is willing to pay) and vi is the 
winning price of the auction. 
A simulated electronic marketplace was developed and 
experiments were conducted separately for heterogeneous and 
homogeneous bidding agents when assessing the bidding 
strategies based on negotiation decision functions and fuzzy 
reasoning techniques. In this research, heterogeneous bidders 
have random or varying willingness-to-bargain levels, here 
called ‘bargain levels’. In contrast, all homogeneous bidders 
have identical bargain levels. 
These bidding strategies were assessed separately in 
different settings, i.e. low-, medium- and high- bid rate 
auctions for each bidding agent acting for the heterogeneous 
bidders. NDF-D and NDF-DC agents with varying bidding 
strategies competed against one another for each type of 
auction separately.   
Bidding agents with various bidding strategies participated 
in each type of auction separately. Experiments were run 50, 
100, 150 and 200 times to test and verify the statistical 
significance of the results. These experiments were also 
carried out separately for each type of homogeneous bidding 
agent in the different bidding environments, in auctions with 
various bid rates. To evaluate the bidding strategies, the Uexp 
of NDF-D and NDF-DC bidding agents was measured in two 
situations: firstly, against the various bid rates of the auctions, 
and secondly, against the different bargain levels of bidders. 
The fuzzy bidding strategies were assessed for 
heterogeneous bidding agents in different bidding 
environments, i.e. auctions of the various bid rates. Fuzzy and 
NDF-DC agents with various bidding strategies competed 
against one another separately in each type of auction.  Again, 
the experiments were run several times to test and verify the 
success rate and expected utility of these bidding agents. 
VI. EXPERIMENTS 
A simulated electronic marketplace was set up to implement 
the ADBA agents and thus demonstrate the performance of the 
bidding strategies. 
A. Market Architecture 
In this marketplace buyers negotiate using different bidding 
strategies rooted in their attitudes, all with the aim of winning 
an auction. The electronic auction market is managed by an 
auction server and can be used by various buyers. The auction 
server is implemented at the server end with Administrator 
agent and it receives information from Initial Price Estimator 
agent and auction database. Bidders are entered into the 
system at the client end using ADBA Bidder agents.  
The Initial Price Estimator agent searches for a target 
auction by assessing the value of the auctioned item using the 
clustering approach and bid mapping and selection technique 
[26]. This agent is also responsible for providing information 
about the target auction to the Administrator agent.  
The Administrator agent maintains the auction information 
provided by the Initial Price Estimator agent. Whenever 
bidder registers with the Administrator agent to buy an item in 
an auction, the Administrator agent creates an ADBA Bidder 
 agent based on the bidding behaviour of the bidder. The 
Administrator agent is also responsible for maintaining 
information about all registered bidders in the auction. It sends 
the information about the target auction to all the registered 
ADBA Bidder agents. The bidder agents compete to win in the 
auction by sending their bids to the Administrator agent. The 
Administrator agent updates participating ADBA Bidder 
agents with the current maximum bid in the auction. At the 
end of the auction, the Administrator agent declares the 
winner. 
An ADBA Bidder agent is responsible for placing bids 
automatically on behalf of its bidder in the target auction. 
Each bidder configures his ADBA Bidder agent according to 
his bidding strategy. The bidder agent computes and sends its 
maximum willingness to pay, at a particular moment in time, 
to the Administrator agent based on the current maximum bid 
in the auction and its bidding behavior. 
Sellers and buyers launch a session in the system by creating 
the Initial Price Estimator agent, the Administrator agent and 
the ADBA Bidder agent via the graphical user interfaces for 
the simulated electronic marketplace and bidder agents. 
The simulated electronic market interface is designed to 
provide complete information about a target auction, including 
its type, its ID, the item reserve price (set by the seller), the 
minimum increment, product (item) information, the product 
image, the bid history, participating bidders, time remaining, 
the current highest bidder and current maximum bid, the 
predicted closing price and the number of iterations for 
simulation run. The interface receives commands from the 
bidders and acts accordingly. It is responsible for updating the 
auction information when messages are received from other 
agents. 
The user interface for ADBA bidder agents is designed to 
record information about each bidder's characteristics, which 
are defined by attributes including their name, bidder type, 
bidding preferences, bidder behaviour, bidding attitude and 
level of desire for bargain (Fig. 5). Bidders select and enter 
bidding strategies according to their preferred bidding 
behaviour. This behaviour is distinguished according to the 
different characteristics of auctions and the bidder’s own 
characteristics submitted via the user interface modules for the 
simulated electronic marketplace and the ADBA bidder 
agents. 
 
Fig. 5.  User interface for ADBA agent 
 
B.  Evaluating the Bidding Agents 
NDF-based biddings strategies are evaluated for 
heterogeneous and homogeneous bidder agents separately. As 
mentioned earlier, heterogeneous bidders had random or 
varying bargain levels, in contrast to the homogeneous bidders 
who had identical bargain levels. 
Bidding strategies were assessed separately in different 
settings of low-, medium- and high- bid-rate auctions for each 
bidding agent serving heterogeneous bidders. NDF-D bidder 
agents and NDF-DC bidder agents with different bidding 
strategies competed against one another. This was repeated 
separately for auctions with each type of bid rate.   
For each type of auction, the bidding agents with various 
strategies were run independently. Experiments were run 50, 
100, 150 and 200 times to test and verify the statistical 
significance of the results. For all the experiments, it was 
found that p>0.05 and F < Fcrit, which shows that the results 
obtained are statistically significant. 
From Fig 6(a), it can be seen that subject to varying bargain 
levels (heterogeneous bidders), the Rsuccess  of NDF-DCs is 
clearly higher than that of NDF-Ds in situations when agents 
with Mystical behaviour compete in medium- and high-bid-
rate auctions. However, in low-bid-rate auction settings, 
Rsuccess  of NDF-Ds is higher. Similarly, Uexp of NDF-DCs is 
higher than that of NDF-Ds when agents with Mystical 
behaviour compete in medium- and high- bid-rate auctions 
(Fig. 6(c) and Fig. 6(d)); in low-bid-rate auctions, the reverse 
is true for these agents and Uexp  of NDF-Ds is higher (Fig. 
6(b)). These results correspond with the intuition that in low-
bid-rate auctions, the bid increments made by these NDF-DCs 
are limited. Agents with Mystical behaviour place bids in the 
closing five seconds of these auctions, i.e. at the point when 
all bidders' bids approach pr. However, the NDF-DC agents' 
consideration of others’ bids reduces their bid increments 
when the low bid rate of auctions also lowers the amounts that 
other participants bid.  
 (a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
 
Fig. 6. Success rate and Expected utility comparison for Mystical behavior 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Success rate and Expected utility comparison for Sturdy behavior 
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Fig. 8. Success rate and expected utility comparison for Strategic bidders 
 
Fig 9. Experiments for homogeneous bidders. Expected utility comparison for Mystical bidders in (a), Sturdy bidders in (b) and Strategic bidders in (c) with 
respect to bid rate. Expected utility comparison for Mystical bidders in (d), Sturdy bidders in (e) and Strategic bidders in (f) with respect to their bargain level. 
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 The auctions in each set of experiments were arranged 
according to the bid amounts approaching the closing price of 
the auction. From the graphed results, it is evident that 
expected utility decreases as auctions approach the closing 
price. This is in line with expectations. 
Rsuccess of NDF-DCs is clearly higher than that of NDF-Ds 
when these heterogeneous agents with Sturdy behaviour 
compete in low-, medium- and high- bid-rate-auctions (Fig. 
7(a)). Similarly, Uexp of these NDF-DCs is also higher than 
that of NDF-Ds competing in low-, medium- and high- bid-
rate auctions (Fig. 7(b) to Fig. 7(d)). In the high-bid-rate 
settings, Rsuccess  and Uexp of the NDF_Ds are zero. This 
corresponds with the intuition that the bid increments made by 
these NDF_Ds are always lower than those of the NDF-DCs. 
Agents with Sturdy behaviour place bids at the beginning of 
the last five minutes of the auction, i.e. at a time-point when 
agents are under less pressure to reach pr than they will be 
near the final moments of the auction. However, the NDF-DC 
agents' consideration of competing bids accelerates their own 
bidding when the high bid rate of an auction raises bid 
amounts.  
NDF-DC agents excel compared with NDF-D agents in 
terms of Rsuccess when we look at heterogeneous agents with 
Strategic behaviour competing across low-, medium- and 
high- bid-rate auction settings (Fig 8(a)). The Uexp of NDF-
DCs is also higher than that of NDF-Ds when these agents 
compete in medium- and high-bid-rate auctions (Fig. 8(c) and 
Fig. 8(d)). However, in auctions with low bid rates, the Uexp of 
the NDF-Ds and that of NDF-DCs overlap with one another 
(Fig. 8(b)). Bidding agents with Strategic behaviour place bids 
throughout the last hour of the auction, and these bids 
approach pr slowly for both NDF-D and NDF-DC agents.   
The NDF-DC agents' consideration of others’ bids hardly 
affects their own bid increments in these low-bid-rate settings 
since all the participants' increments are approximately the 
same as those of NDF-Ds due to their Strategic behaviour. 
The experiments were carried out separately for each type 
of the homogeneous bidder agents across various bidding 
environments, i.e. auctions with different bid rates. The Uexp of 
the bidder agents was measured in two situations: firstly, 
against the various bid rates of the auctions and secondly, 
against the different bargain levels of the bidders. 
The results of these experiments showed the following: 
Across auctions of different bid rates, homogeneous NDF-
DCs with Sturdy behaviour and NDF-DCs with Strategic 
behaviour always achieve higher Uexp than their respective 
NDF-D equivalents (Fig. 9(b)  and Fig. 9(c)). In the case of 
agents with Mystical behaviour, NDF-DCs outperform NDF-
Ds when they compete in medium-to high bid-rate auctions; in 
low-bid-rate auctions, however, these NDF-Ds achieve higher 
Uexp than the NDF-DCs do (Fig 9(a)).  This corresponds with 
an intuition similar to the one about the heterogeneous 
bidders. In low-bid-rate auctions, NDF-DCs with Mystical 
behaviour have limited bid increments. The agents with 
Mystical behaviour place bids in the closing five seconds of an 
auction at the point when all participants’ bids approach pr. 
However, the NDF-DC agents' consideration of others’ bids 
reduces their bid increments when the low bid rate decreases 
the amounts that other participants bid.  
The Uexp of homogeneous NDF-based bidding agents was 
also measured against their different bargain levels varying 
from 0 to 100 in steps of 5. Here Uexp represents the average of 
expected utilities of bidding agents in auctions with various 
bid-rates. The results showed that the NDF-DCs with 
Mystical, Sturdy and Strategic behaviours always achieved 
higher Uexp than the counterpart NDF-Ds of each of these 
types (Fig. 9(d), Fig. 9(e) and Fig. 9(f)). 
In the second set of experiments, Fuzzy bidding agents 
were evaluated against  NDF-DC bidding agents in an auction 
environment similar to that described above for heterogeneous 
bidders. For each rule given in Section V, fuzzy relations (R1, 
R2, R3 and R4) were constructed using Mamdani's method for 
fuzzy relations and compositional rule of inference. R1 is 
shown as in Fig. 10 and the total fuzzy relation R is given as in 
Fig. 11.  
 
 
 
Fig. 10.  Fuzzy relation for the fuzzy rule R1 
 
 
 
Fig. 11.  Total fuzzy relation R 
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 The output fuzzy set ΔP’ on ΔP was calculated for different 
bidding strategies of bidders using input fuzzy sets E’ on E 
and C’ on C by applying Mamdani’s compositional rule of 
inference for different levels of competition (low and high). A 
definite value of the bid increment was calculated by 
defuzzifying ΔP’ using a centre of gravity with the weighted 
mean method. The actual value of the bid amount is calculated 
using multiple linear regression approach. The experiments 
were carried out for each type of heterogeneous bidder agents 
separately in different auction environments with various bid 
rates. Rsuccess and Uexp of the bidder agents were averaged over 
auctions with various bid rates for each type of heterogeneous 
bidder. The results are clear in Fig. 12 and Fig. 13. The Fuzzy 
agents with Mystical, Sturdy and Strategic behaviour 
outperform their NDF-DCs counterparts of their same 
behavioural types with respect to Rsuccess    and Uexp. 
 
 
Fig.12. Success rate comparison for Fuzzy and NDF-DC agents 
 
 
Fig.13. Expected utility comparison for Fuzzy and NDF-DC agents 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we presented a design of bidding strategies for 
buyers based on their different bidding behaviors. Bidding 
strategies have been designed that emphasise bidding 
characteristics such as an auction’s attributes, the bidder's own 
attitude to winning the auction and other bidders’ 's behavior. 
The design has drawn on Mamdani’s Method for fuzzy 
relations and the compositional rule of inference; it has also 
invoked time- and behaviour- dependent negotiation decision 
functions. The performance of the heterogeneous and 
homogeneous bidders following the bidding strategies 
designed were then measured separately across wide-ranging 
test environments subject to different auction settings and 
bidding restrictions. The results demonstrate that bidding 
agents who adopt the fuzzy regression based bidding approach 
outperform agents following the methodology of Negotiation 
Decision Functions in terms of success and expected utility 
across most settings. 
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